The cardboard box study: understanding collaborative data management in the connected home by Kilic, Damla et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
The cardboard box study: understanding collaborative
data management in the connected home
Damla Kilic1 & Andy Crabtree1 & Glenn McGarry1 & Murray Goulden2
Received: 30 October 2020 /Accepted: 15 September 2021
# The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
The home is a site marked by the increasing collection and use of personal data, whether online or from connected devices. This
trend is accompanied by new data protection regulation and the development of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that seek
to enable individual control over the processing of personal data. However, a great deal of the data generated within the connected
home is interpersonal in nature and cannot therefore be attributed to an individual. The cardboard box study adapts the technology
probe approach to explore with potential end users the salience of a PET called the Databox and to understand the challenge of
collaborative rather than individual data management in the home. The cardboard box study was designed as an ideation card
game and conducted with 22 households distributed around the UK, providing us with 38 participants. Demographically, our
participants were of varying ages and had a variety of occupational backgrounds and differing household situations. The study
makes it perspicuous that privacy is not a ubiquitous concernwithin the home as a great deal of data is shared by default of people
living together; that when privacy is occasioned it performs a distinct social function that is concerned with human
security and the safety and integrity of people rather than devices and data; and that current ‘interdependent privacy’
solutions that seek to support collaborative data management are not well aligned with the ways access control is
negotiated and managed within the home.
Keywords Connected home . Internet of Things . Databox . Personal data . Interdependent privacy . Collaborative data
management
1 Introduction
Personal data has and continues to receive a great deal of
attention. In technological quarters, it is often referred to as
the oil of the digital economy, or some similar analogy is
invoked to denote personal data as resource that is valuable
to innovation and economic growth. The turn to data-driven
innovation has been accompanied by widespread societal
concern—witness the Facebook and Cambridge Analytica
scandal for prime example (though this is by no means the
only one)—and has been accompanied by new data protection
legislation. The EU, for example, implemented the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018, and the USA
and Japan have considered upgrades to their legislation with
varying degrees of success [2, 47]. What is common across
both legal and technological sectors is the focus on the indi-
vidual. Personal data is seen and treated as something that
either belongs to a user (natural person or data subject in legal
terms) or is generated by them in the course of their interac-
tions with digital applications and services, a point
underscored by GDPR [24]:
‘personal data’ means any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’);
an identifiable natural person is one who can be identi-
fied, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identifier such as a name, an identification number,
location data, an online identifier or to one or more
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mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that nat-
ural person. (Article 4, our emphasis)
The upshot is that many and varied privacy enhancing tech-
nology (PET) initiatives that seek to protect personal data—e.-
g. Mydex [46], OpenPDS [16], HAT [70], MyData [54],
Databox [44] and Solid [63]—invariably focus on the individ-
ual in society, not the social group.
Laudable as such endeavours are they nevertheless over-
look the fact that a great deal of the data generated within the
connected home [31] is interpersonal in nature [28] and cannot
therefore be attributed to an individual [17]. Take smart meters
or indeed an increasing range of connected domestic appli-
ances (TVs, washing machines, kettles, toasters, heating sys-
tems, lights, etc.). Unless one lives alone, and not simply in a
legal sense of sole occupier but in the sense of never hosting
others, the domestic Internet of Things generates unprecedent-
ed amounts of data that is essentially born social [19]. Of
course, individuals may have their own connected devices,
but as the digital is increasingly embedded within the very
fabric of domestic life—in physical structures, fixtures, fit-
tings and the mobilia of the home [58] from appliances to fast
moving consumer goods [8]—then an increasing amount of
the data generated in the connected home of the future will be
tied to multi-party interactions. It is not hard to appreciate then
that connecting a myriad mundane thing to the Internet, in-
cluding an increasing array of consumables wrapped up in
intelligent packaging [75], will reach beyond the individual
in many millions and indeed billions of cases worldwide.
Why does this matter? GDPR exempts data processing for
‘purely personal or household activity’ (Article 2 & Recital
18), which means household members can process data gen-
erated by their co-inhabitants as they wish, and data born
social stands outside legal protection even in the most ad-
vanced regulatory regimes. While significant efforts are being
made to empower individual data management, there is a sig-
nificant gap in our understanding of the increasing collection
and use of personal data in social contexts generally and the
home in particular and the concomitant challenge of enabling
collaborative rather than individual data management in the
connected home. We thus designed and deployed the ‘card-
board box’, a proxy for a PET called the Databox [14] with the
aim of understanding how people reason about data within the
connected home and the challenges this might raise for col-
laborative data management, where the management of data
involves or implicates more than one party. The Databox is
intended to sit at the edge of the network in the home [45] and
act as a gateway to an individual’s personal data, enabling
users to install apps that process their data locally to deliver
personalised services. That it is intended to do so explains the
need for a proxy—the Databox was not in deployable state at
the time of the study. However, we saw no reason why we
could not probe the Databox concept with householders cum
potential end users, along with the challenges bound up in
collaborative data management to inform ongoing develop-
ment of the platform.
For the study, the cardboard box in question was used
alongside a set of ideation cards [39] in card sorting exercise,
in order to explore participants’ reasoning concerning the ap-
propriate management of different forms of domestic data that
were potentially interpersonal in nature. In Section 2, we con-
sider relevant literature in the privacy study field. Section 3
explains our methodology via an unpacking of both the card-
board box, the associated ideation cards and the data collec-
tion and analysis. Sections 4, 5 and 6 cover findings, discus-
sion and conclusions, respectively.
The results and primary contributions of this study reshape
our understanding of privacy within the home, where it is
often assumed (if it is considered at all) that inhabits have an
abiding concern to withhold information from those they live
with. The presumption in part underpins the development of
PETs, and while our study does find that people have occa-
sional need for privacy in their everyday lives, it is an
occasioned matter driven by an abiding concern with human
security and the need to protect others from online harms and
ensure their integrity as social actors, much more than it is to
withhold information about one’s digital activities from co-
inhabitants. It is not then data privacy that matters mostwithin
the home, as much is already accessible. Rather it is the
negotiated nature of data access and use that underpins and
articulates the collaborative management of data between
household members. The value of data in this context lies less
in the preservation of personal secrets and more in its
exchange, at times deliberate and at others serendipitous, in
coordinating the mundane activities of everyday life. In short,
what is at stake is not simply the privacy of individuals, but the
social and moral ordering of the group [9]. In this respect, we
find that existing approaches to collaborative data manage-
ment furnished by efforts to engineer ‘interdependent privacy’
[34] do not resonate with the ways in which access control is
socially managed and negotiated within the home. We con-
clude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.
2 Background
The dynamic and contested character of data access in the
home undermines the predominant concept of privacy in so-
cial and technical studies, namely the ‘privacy as control’
thesis attributed to legal scholar Alan Westin [71]. This thesis
construes of privacy as the ability for an individual to control,
edit and delete information about oneself and decide when,
how and to what extent information is communicated with
others. Sandra Petronio’s communicative theory of privacy
management [53], predicated on the dialectical tension and
interplay between individuals and the group, would appear
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to be much more apposite. However, this thesis, which shifts
the focus from the individual to the individual-as-a-member-
of-a-group, is reminiscent of early debate in the field of
computer-supported cooperative work (CSCW), which found
such a conception deeply problematic [30]. At the nub of the
debate is the recognition that individuals are not merely situ-
ated in groups but are ‘mutually dependent’ upon one another
and thus ‘meshed together’ in social units [62]. Understanding
and unpacking mutual dependence and the ways in which
social units are meshed together became CSCW’s unique
and distinctive problem, resolved through the explication of
‘work practice’, i.e. the empirical elaboration of social prac-
tices that organisewhat individuals do synchronously or asyn-
chronously, whether they are co-located or distributed [6].
However, efforts to recognise the socially organised nature
of privacy, and to build it into the analytic apparatus of social
studies and technology development alike, turn on the inade-
quate conceptualisation of the individual-as-the-member-of-a-
group.
Thus, and for example, Irwin Altman’s [1] ‘boundary man-
agement’ thesis, famously championed by Palen and Dourish
[51] in a systems design context, construes of privacy as a
process of ‘dynamic boundary regulation’ in which selective
access to the self is governed by the individual-in-interaction.
Altman’s thesis underpins Petronio’s [53], which seeks to
elaborate how boundaries are regulated through rule develop-
ment, particularly of co-ownership and guardianship, and how
breakdowns are managed. The notion of rules as key to social
organisation also chimes with Helen Nissenbaum’s [48] influ-
ential concept of ‘contextual integrity’, where privacy is seen
to be governed by context-specific norms and values that reg-
ulate the flow of information. Rules, norms and values provide
for laymen and analysts alike a generic, common-sense frame-
work organising the actions of the individual-as-a-member-of-
the-group (see the work of the eminent sociologist Talcott
Parsons [52] for prime example). However, in the social sci-
ences, they have long been understood to be a problematic
means of accounting for social organisation [21]. Simply
put, there is a ‘praxiological gap’ between rules, norms and
values and their enactment in everyday life. As Rawls [23]
puts it with respect to rules, for example, they cannot tell you
how to follow them, that would entail an infinite regress, and
as vom Lehn [69] explains, norms and values do not, in prac-
tice, provide a generic framework for action but are instead
occasioned and ad hoc resources invoked, made relevant and
used locally by members to organise action in situ.
The relevance of this sociological argument to the devel-
opment of privacy enhancing technologies lies in understand-
ing how technological solutions do, or do not, align with it. Of
particular note are efforts to engineer solutions supporting
‘interdependent privacy’ [34]. The concept pulls together var-
ious ideas that recognise the social nature of personal data. It
includes ‘collective privacy’ [64], ‘multi-party privacy’ [66],
‘networked privacy’ [4], ‘multiple-subject privacy’ [25], ‘peer
privacy’ [7] and ‘group privacy’ [57]. These various concepts
of privacy have subtly different meanings but coalesce around
two key thematics. The first one is the impact of others on
one’s privacy where, for example, data affect not only the
individual who shares the data but those implicated in or re-
lated to it [4], including the disclosure of an individual’s pri-
vate information by peers [7], or the actions of persons sur-
rounding an individual (friends, family, strangers in the public
space, etc.) affect the individual’s privacy [57]. The second
one is the collaborative management of personal data, where
the members of a group collectively manage data [64], more
than one party controls the visibility of data [66], and no single
person has the right to control how the data is shared [25].
Interdependent privacy recognises that a great deal of data is
both social by default—emails, phone calls, social media
posts and photos are often cited to demonstrate the point—
and that the data is at the outset enmeshed in social
relationships (friendship, kinship and broader social net-
works). To use the nomenclature of the UK Information
Commissioner’s Office, personal data is often ‘mixed’,
i.e. inextricably linked to other data subjects [35].
The recognition that personal data is often mixed, and is
thus meshed together with multiple parties, has led to the
development of interdependent privacy mechanisms to enable
group-level privacy management. These largely focus on on-
line social networks (OSN), but there appears to have been
some work around mobile phones [27] and shared PETs [26].
There is also a predominant focus on collaborative access
control. Wishart et al. [72] thus exploit privacy policies to
allow the owner of content to nominate co-owners who can
change the scope of a policy to reflect their own interests.
González-Manzano et al. [26] developed a PET for managing
co-owned data that similarly allows a data owner to assign co-
ownership to data and for each party to specify access control
policies; ownership trumps co-ownership where conflicts
arise. Hu et al. [33] developed a multi-party access control
model that aggregates privacy policies from different catego-
ries of user to decide whether to deny or grant access and uses
a voting mechanism to resolve privacy conflicts. Mehregan
and Fong [43] extend the relationship-based access control
(ReBAC) model to support interactive policy negotiation,
obliging co-owners to collaboratively specify a policy negoti-
ation protocol regulating access to data. Ilia et al. [36] exploit
privacy policies alongside facial recognition to regulate the
visibility of photos, blurring the faces of users who have re-
stricted access. Li et al. [41] encrypt the faces in photos so that
they are only visible if a viewer is given a key, and a similar
approach is adopted by Olteanu et al. [50].
A further body of work coalesces around the detection and
resolution of conflicts. In addition to those methods of conflict
resolution outlined above, Hu et al. [32] have developed an
algorithmic model that exploits automated voting strategies to
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resolve conflicts. Automated approaches also exploit the
ReBAC model to detect and resolve conflicts in privacy pol-
icies based onmeasures of the relationship strength or intima-
cy that holds between two users, derived from their online
activity and interactions, which triggers an automated agent-
based, one-step negotiation protocol [65]. Agent-based nego-
tiation strategies are further extended by Keküllüoğlu et al.
[40] and exploit a point-based system to measure reciprocity
as a resource for conflict resolution. The turn to automation
and AI sees the use of facial recognition to automatically
detect people in photos that have been shared on OSNs [74]
and to obfuscate them [42]. Zhong et al. [76] use a
convolutional neural net to automatically detect potential pri-
vacy conflicts in photographs.
The purpose of this whistle stop tour around the interde-
pendent privacy literature is to understand the broad ways in
which computing is being used to support the collaborative
management of mixed data. What we see is that support is
largely focussed on collaborative access control, which re-
volves around the specification of privacy policies, and to a
lesser extent on detecting and resolving conflicts, particularly
through the use of machine learning and AI. While interde-
pendent privacy is to be commended for recognising the in-
herently social nature of a great deal of data in the networked
world, these solutions are nonetheless problematic in a domes-
tic context. Interdependent privacy solutions developed for
online social networks, and which are largely limited to
photos at the current moment in time, are not well-suited to
the home. For example, it would be absurd for the members of
a family to assign co-ownership, specify individual privacy
policies, and redact individual images in family photos, while
this could potentially be done automatically, that would be to
miss the point, as this is not what we do because they are
family photos.
The kind of solutions currently offered by interdependent
privacy is a consequence of seeing people as individual-
members-of-a-group whose privacy needs protection, which
might work well in OSNs but not a domestic context, where
no matter how it is composed (e.g. traditional middle-class
nuclear family, LGBTQ, single parent, ethnic minority, reli-
gious, secular), people are members of a discrete social unit.
While the relationships, expectations and responsibilities are
different, the same applies to shared households. The mem-
bers of these social units are not simply individuals-in-a-
group; the group has facticity of its own that members orient
to and use to define their relationships and the expectations
and responsibilities that hold between them, be it parenting,
cooking, doing the washing up, paying the bills, etc.
Furthermore, members of the unit know, and are expected to
know, private, often intimate and even highly sensitive things
about one another, and this knowledge is, indeed, key to what
makes them a family and to a lesser degree a household. Thus,
a great deal of what passes for data in the home, even personal
data that may clearly be attributed to an individual (data of
birth, driving licence, passport, bills, medical information, po-
litical affiliation, sexuality, etc.), are shared by default of our
living together, a point underscored by much of our data.
3 Methods
The study took the form of a game-like activity played in
participant’s homes at a date and time of their choosing.
Participants were first informed of the purpose of the game
and consented in writing to allow us to study their playing of it
before being introduced to the gameplay procedures described
below. Data captured during the study consisted of audio re-
cordings of the participants and researchers’ talk, and photo-
graphs of the cards placed in the red and blue boxes after the
game had been played (as per Fig. 1). The game sessions
lasted between 50 min and 2 h. The audio data was subse-
quently transcribed and anonymised and yielded 547 pages
and 170,000 words of data.
3.1 Participants
Ethics approval for the cardboard box study (application ref-
erence CS-2018-R5) was obtained in accordance with the
University of Nottingham’s research procedures [68], and data
collection was subsequently undertaken over a 3-month peri-
od between September and December 2018. We recruited 22
households distributed around the UK providing us with 38
participants via our social networks (no incentives or rewards
were offered or received). Household composition varied and
included families with children, couples, housemates and peo-
ple who lived alone. Where more than one member of the
household participated in the activity described below, they
did so together. We anticipated that the discussion of digital
data and privacy may similarly implicate and affect children,
and so where children were interested and parents or guard-
ians deemed it appropriate, we thought it relevant and indeed
necessary not to exclude them from our studies. Therefore,
children under the age of 16 were involved in the studies,
albeit as part of a household group, and not individually.
Demographically, our participants were of varying ages and
had a variety of occupational backgrounds and differing
household situations, as can be seen in Table 1. Our sample
was nearly gender-balanced: 55% of participants identified as
female and 45% as male. Most of the participants (87%) were
between 20 and 59 years old. Twenty-six of our participants
were British by birth and upbringing, and 12 were not.
In discussing the participating cohort, it is important to
a cknow l edge t h e imp l i c a t i o n s o f t h e s t udy ’ s
ethnomethodologically informed understanding of what the
object of study in design-focused research is, and what this
means for notions of generalisability. Our research interest lies
Pers Ubiquit Comput
in members’mundane reasoning [55] about everyday encoun-
ters, enabled by what Sacks [60] calls ‘the machinery of in-
teraction’, the mechanisms by which we order everyday
shared experiences. We do this not with the intention of ex-
haustively documenting our settings—we are not
anthropologists—but to generate technology-agnostic design
insights applicable to the culture studied [12].
The ques t ion of app l icab i l i ty b r ings us to
generalisability. Our claims of generalisability hinge
not upon quantified, positivistic reasoning where scale
is central, but rather on a recognition that culture itself
provides for such generalisability in order that society is
able to operate as a shared coherent reality. That is to
say, beneath the specific local enactments of any inter-
action, the ordered reasoning discovered in any one set-
ting does not belong to that setting, but the culture it is
a part of, and is recognisable to members of that cul-
ture. As our interest is in commonly recognisable rea-
soning, we do not seek to further subdivide our sample
by any defined variables.
The culture in question here might be broadly glossed as
‘British’, though our participants who were not British by
birth or upbringing did not—at the level of mundane reason-
ing we address here—exhibit notably different repertoires.
We do not claim a generalisability beyond this culture, but
we do highlight that in an increasingly interconnected world,
profound cultural differences at the level of mundane
reasoning should not be assumed to begin at national bound-
aries. Here we invoke a test of recognisability—if our findings
are recognisable to the reader, as our participants’ reasoning
was recognisable to us, then there are solid grounds for declar-
ing the findings applicable to the reader’s own context [11, 12].
The limits of this generalizability we return to in Section 5.2.
3.2 Designing and deploying the Databox proxy
The Databox proxy (Fig. 1) consists of two cardboard boxes,
two decks of ideation cards and a set of guidelines explaining
what the boxes signify and what participants are supposed to
do with the cards—rules of the game as it were—which were
affixed to the boxes. While the Databox is a single unit, two
cardboard boxes were required to clearly reflect its function-
ality and allow participants to reason about the decisions they
would have to make. Thus, one box (a red box on the left of
Fig. 1) was labelled Keep My Data Private and the other (a
blue box) was labelled Others Can Access My Data. The first
(green) deck of ideation cards (running across the middle of
Fig. 1) presented different types of data that might be found in
the current and future connected home; the second (yellow)
deck is data processing requests that might be made by third-
party apps. The rules instructed participants that if they
wanted to keep their data private, they should place the cards
from deck one in the red box. However, if they wished to
share the data with someone they knew, either a family mem-
ber, friend or some other personal acquaintance, then they
should place the cards from deck one in the blue box. This
broad set of relationship categories purposefully covered a
wide gamut of possibilities, in recognition of the fact that these
categories are porous and their implications across different
households vary. While the distinction between household
member and non-household member might be sharp in some
cases, such as might be found in the nuclear family of white
middle classes, in others, such as white working class
and some ethnic minority communities, non-household
members might play a much more prominent role in
domestic life. By keeping this wording broad, we
sought to allow for such variation, which could then


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































be picked up in the analysis of what was said—which
as discussed below was of greater importance than card
placement.
For the second deck, which does not feature in our analysis
here due to space constraints, participants were instructed to
put third-party apps they viewed as making unacceptable use
of their data in the red box and those they could see some
value in, in the blue box. If participants could not decide
which box to place a card in, then it was placed in between
the boxes and returned to afterwards for further deliberation.
A final (red) card asked participants what they thought about
the Databox concept and whether or not they could see a use
for such a device in their everyday lives.
Working through the decks was no mere card sorting ex-
ercise. Indeed, we were not especially interested in what cards
ended up in which box, but rather in the mundane reasoning
[55] that provided for their placement. We therefore asked
participants to articulate their decision-making, whether to
the researcher or other family members or both, to give voice
to taken for granted issues of privacy and personal data use,
current and prospective, in their homes. In our interactions
with participants, we referred to the activity as a ‘game’ to
cultivate a tone of playfulness, which we were keen to harness
to open up an engaging dialogue between family members
and/or flatmates around personal and potentially sensitive
topics. The designation also recognised that the assignation
of cards was a collaborative, rule-bound and goal-directed
activity, which we felt would aid in developing and sustaining
a shared orientation. The rules of the game were purposefully
lightweight. They did not, for example, seek to impose any
particular turn-taking in the sessions where multiple family
members were taking part to ensure parity of contribution.
Questions were directed to the group, and individuals were
free to contribute as much or as little as they wished.
Insofar as the game was played in household groups, then
the articulation was often collaborative, occasionally
contested and arrived at through mutual elaboration. There
were of course also occasions when group members held dif-
ferent and competing views, which led to some cards not
being placed in either the red (keep private) or blue (others
can access) boxes and the same applied to cards that were seen
to be about irrelevant data.
3.3 Designing the ideation cards
We are not the first to make use of ideation cards in design.
We use the term as a generic descriptor for the use of cards as a
structuring device for research activities, not in the sense of
the activities we used them for being ideational. In their survey
of card-based design tools, Wölfel and Merritt [73] note that
card-based approaches ‘have been used widely by designers’
to articulate the design process, make specific design pro-












































































































































































and users. A broad range of card-based approaches are avail-
able to designers (Wölfel and Merritt identify eighteen), and
an increasing array of online tools support their use. We de-
signed our own cards from scratch, creating two different
decks of 24 cards each, the first deck representing different
types of data that can currently and will foreseeably be found
in the connected home and the second deck representing third-
party data processing apps that would exploit the data repre-
sented in the first deck. The decks were colour-coded to dis-
tinguish between them (as noted above, data types were green,
apps yellow), and they were printed on paper and inserted in
transparent sleeves. Both decks of cards were designed in a
portrait format, with typical playing-card size dimensions (8
× 6 cm). Each card consists of four parts: the name of the
ideation card, the card number, icons illustrating the data types
or data processing and an explanation of each card (Fig.2); the
back of the cards does not contain any content.
The first step in designing card content involved specifying
data types that can currently and foreseeably be found in the
connected home. We thus considered common data types cur-
rently found in our own homes and of people we know—e.g.
web browsing histories, social media, photos and videos, on-
line services such as banking and shopping, location data from
our phones, black boxes for monitoring driving in cars, Alexa
and Siri. We then turned to the Internet to identify IoT devices
and products for the home and the data they generate, includ-
ing the Internet of Useless Things [38], the Internet of Shit
[37] and Postscapes [56], which allowed us to identify a broad
range of connected devices that would generate data about
everyday activities across the home. We also took research
that we knew of into account, such as the Predictive
Shopping List [20], the Living Room of the Future [59] and
the Connected Shower [15]. We categorised devices and data
into different types, online, wearable, environmental, smart
products and appliances, vehicles, etc., as a means of collating
the results of our survey (we use the term loosely) and parsing
the rather large collection of discrete data sources finding their
way into the connected home.
Having identified different types of domestic data, we
set about formulating card content. This was an iterative
process that consisted of narrowing down the range of
potential options to a manageable proportion that could
be addressed by participants in a reasonable time frame.
We ended up with twenty-four data type cards falling
under two main categories that we thought easy explain-
able to participants: online data and connected devices.
The deck thus consisted of eleven online data cards and
thirteen connected device data cards spanning a broad
range of everyday activities from surfing the web to the
apps used on mobile phones to biometric data, activity
tracking, voice logs, home security devices, etc. (see
[39] for full details). We then designed the second deck
of data processing cards, each one matched to a corre-
sponding data type card (see Fig. 2). The cards were
then piloted on handful of colleagues to check their
legibility, and minor amendments were made to text
and images as needed prior to engaging participants
with the Databox proxy.
Fig. 2 The ideation cards (see [39] for all cards)
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3.4 Data analysis
Analysis of the data involved obtaining a gross overview of
participant reaction by quantifying the responses to each card
in terms of how many participants wanted to share or keep the
data private (see Fig. 3, for example). We then drilled down
into the transcripts to understand the reasoning that accounted
for participants’ overall response to each card. Analysis here
was initially done by the whole team and focused on identi-
fying the discrete issues that occupied the participants’ talk.
We worked through a transcript for each card as a team, at-
tending to explicit or implicit characterisations of the issue,
and then members of the research team worked through the
other transcripts individually, searching for other instances of
the same issue or alternate issues. These were then collated,
which allowed us to identify a spectrum of issues ranging
from the positive to the negative accounting for the overall
response to each card.
Our approach towards understanding the discrete response
patterns emerging from the cardboard box study might be
construed of as thematic analysis [5], but we would character-
ise it as the documentary method of interpretation.
The method consists of treating an actual appearance
[e.g., an utterance or sequence of talk] as ‘the document
of’, as ‘pointing to’, as ‘standing on behalf of’ a
presupposed underlying pattern. Not only is the under-
lying pattern derived from its individual documentary
evidences … the individual documentary evidences, in
their turn, are interpreted on the basis of ‘what is known’
about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate
the other. The method is recognisable for the ev-
eryday necessities of recognising what a person is
‘talking about’ … [21]
Ours is a common-sense method of interpretation used by
professional analysts and lay persons alike, though ‘rarely’
acknowledged as sociologist Harold Garfinkel (ibid.) points
out. It underpins thematic analysis as well as a broad range of
analytic methods in the social sciences and HCI. It is indis-
pensable to the practical job of making decisions about what
persons are talking about (amongst many other sociological
phenomenon) and determining when the same is the same,
thereby enabling us to identify discrete patterns in our data.
The decision-making and determination turn on being a
‘member’ [22] or competent speaker of a natural language
subject to the ‘hearer’s maxim’ [61]. As speakers of a natural
language known in common and shared with our participants,
we employed the hearer’s maxim to identify the issues that
occupied our participants’ reasoning as manifest in their ver-
bal consideration of each ideation card and thereby mapped
out the spectrum of issues providing for the discrete response
patterns represented in the pie charts. The mapping (i.e. the
spectrum of issues accompanying each ideation card) is avail-
able online [39]. It should be seen and treated as an initial
characterisation or sketch, rather than an exhaustive descrip-
tion, subject to revision, elaboration and refinement (e.g. as
done in the course of writing up specific results for this paper)
through continued use of and adherence to the hearer’s
maxim.
4 Findings
Participant response to the Databox proposition was generally
positive. Overall, 75% of participants could see a place for
such a device in their everyday lives for a variety reasons
ranging from its perceived ability to enable agency, consent
and control over data sharing, allowing people to be more
Fig. 3 Responses to card number
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aware and informed about data use by third parties,
minimising data distribution, reducing the risk of exposure
to ‘unsavoury characters’, safeguarding household members
and increasing privacy, choice and utility. Nevertheless, some
participants entertained reservations about security and the
potential for ‘hacking’, seeing the Databox as a potential ‘hon-
ey pot’ for thieves either online or physically. The perceived
risks of ‘putting all your eggs in one basket’ largely
underpinned 25% of participants rejecting the Databox prop-
osition, though there was a minor view that ‘we already have
enough tech to manage in everyday life’. Participants were
also generally receptive to the idea of apps that process their
personal data in return for some personalised service but
showed a marked resistance to third-party apps that sought
to process data regarding personal finance, location, social
media and messages, data generated by smart vacuums and
toys, voice logs, smart bathroom and personally identifiable
data including biometric data (again see [39] for the specific
app propositions with respect to these data). Resistance to the
uses of such data was not necessarily due to concerns about
the data itself but the appropriateness of the app propositions.
For example, the proposed use of GPS data to alert family
members when another was running late was seen as running
contrary to social expectations and persons doing one another
‘the courtesy’ of contacting those who need to know such
information.
We would like to say more about participants’ response to
the Databox and specific app propositions, but we are
cognisant of the constraints of space and the focus of this
paper on collaborative data management in the connected
home. We must then set aside these aspects of the study here
and attend to the first deck of cards, which sought explore the
interpersonal nature of data sharing. When asked to consider
different types of personal data that can currently and will
foreseeably be found in the connected home, we thus asked
participants if they wished to share the data represented on
cards one to twenty-four with someone they knew, either a
family member, friend or some other personal acquaintance,
and to articulate their reasoning for doing, or not doing, so.
Overall responses to deck one can be seen in Fig. 4. It can
be seen at a glance, perhaps surprisingly for those wedded to
the presumption of privacy, that the majority of cards were
treated as referencing types of data that others can access.
These include cards 1 (browsing history), 2 (apps used), 4
(location data showing places visited), 5 (personally identifi-
able data), 6 (personal videos and photos), 7 (films and mu-
sic), 9 (shopping data), 11 (gaming data), 12 (location data for
family monitoring), 13 (location data for monitoring pets), 14
(data about your baby’s breathing and temperature), 15 (phys-
ical activity data), 16 (data about environmental conditions in
the home), 18 (data from household security devices), 19 (data
about your household appliances), 21 (data about devices con-
nected to your home network), 22 (smart toy data) and 23
(data about your cleaning practices and routines).
Nevertheless, cards 1, 9, 12, 17 (voice logs from Alexa,
etc.), 20 (driving data) and 22 were closely contested, and
cards 3 (SMS, email or social media messages), 8 (financial
data), 10 (biometric data) and 24 (smart bathroom data)
were strongly viewed as referencing data that should be
kept private.
Figure 4 also makes it perspicuous that some minority of
participants misinterpreted most of the cards. The purpose of
this deck of cards was to provoke mundane reasoning about
interpersonal data sharing in a domestic context. However,
accessing or sharing ‘data’ is rarely occasioned as a topic for
discussion in its own right in the ordinary run of domestic life,
and it can, as the frequent but largely low level of
misinterpreted responses indicate, be a difficult proposition
to parse. Participants had no difficulty in understanding that
external actors generally wanted to access their data, but
accessing one another’s data occasionally eluded them when
considering specific data types, which led to cards being
misinterpreted and participants therefore reasoned about data
sharing in terms of third-party access, rather than sharing data
with someone they knew. Thus browsing history—well
recognised as a target for external actors—was misunderstood
by four participants, while messaging was not misunderstood
by any. The latter, we would suggest, is less often subject to
discussions of third-party monitoring (indeed increasingly
such apps encrypt conversations) but is readily analogous to
overhearing a house member’s phone conversation, or reading
their diary. As such it was easily parsable as a matter of inter-
personal concern.
That people do not usually talk about accessing or sharing
‘data’, and occasionally misinterpreted the purpose of this
deck of cards, does not mean that they had nothing to say
about interpersonal data sharing in a domestic context. On
the contrary, as Fig. 4 indicates and invites us to inspect a rich
array of reasoning underpinned participants responses to deck
one and its towards unpacking this that we now turn. We
should note, however, that just as we do not have sufficient
space to elaborate participants’ response to the Databox and
specific app propositions, then so we are constrained as to
what we can say about deck one cards. It is not possible to
treat each card separately. Instead, we examine the different
orders of mundane reasoning that account for the overall re-
sponse patterns surfaced in Fig. 4 to elaborate key issues in-
volved in arriving at decisions to keep data private within the
home, to allow others access and to contest access. It is with
the former that we begin.
4.1 Keeping data private
Several discrete orders of mundane reasoning were invoked
by participants in accounting for their decisions to keep data
private within the home. These include the need to keep data
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private to avoid harms, manage accountability, preserve au-
tonomy, exercise choice, maintain control and address under-
lying concerns about the Databox proposition and data sharing
in general. We italicise text to indicate direct quotations from
our participants below, and the specific cards that occasioned
their comments are reference in brackets.
4.1.1 Avoiding harm
While Fig. 4 makes it perspicuous that participants were will-
ing to let others access a great deal of their data, there were
occasions when they deemed it necessary to keep data private
within the home. Participants did not want to give others lim-
itless and uncontrolled access to their data (C6, C10), it would
be a step too far(C24) as nobody needs to know (C1, C15,
C16), and it should not be anybody’s interest (C2). As one
participant put it with respect to location data (C4), for
example:
G5 / M: I just do not wish people to know where I am
24/7 … why you would want anybody to know where
you are walking!
Not only did the prospect of unfettered access make partici-
pants feel uncomfortable (C8, C10, C12, C14, C15, C18);
some data were seen as highly personal, containing lots of
private information (C6, C8, C9, C15) and even dangerous
things(C10) that others might use against them (C20).
Unfettered access posed a threat to personal security, poten-
tially enabling others to pretend to be them when they are
not(C10) or opening them up to other forms of attack such
as burglary (C4). It was also the case that decisions to keep
data private were accounted for by participants in terms of the
perceived need to protect the privacy of the other people they
lived with and who were in their care. Unfettered access
would then be risky for children’s safety (C6), as there are
too many dodgy people (C22), and participants felt the demon-
strable need to show respect to family members in the round
(C12). It is clear then that participants’ reasoning around pri-
vacy decisions was shot through with moral considerations of
the potential harms to people occasioned by unfettered access
to data in an interpersonal context. Thus, decisions to keep
data private were not ‘simply’ made on the tautological
grounds that the data is nobody else’s business, but generally
accounted for and warranted in terms of avoiding perceptible
harms to both the individuals doing the decision-making and
the other’s they lived with who may affected by their
decisions.
4.1.2 Accountability
This general concern with what might be called ‘human secu-
rity’ and avoiding harm coalesced specifically around the
issue of accountability. Privacy decisions thus hinged on the
perceived potential for data to be used by others to hold par-
ticipants to account, as the following extract, which arose in
the course of a couple considering the use of Netflix and
determining what to do with film and music data, illustrates
(C7):
G8 /M: I watched a program once about hookers and we
had an argument about that didn’t we? (Both laugh). It
was a Louie Theroux kind of thing. And that felt kind of,
you know, it popped up and we had an argument about
that and I thought, “Well hang on a minute.”
G8 / F: Well, it was a bit letchy wasn’t it?
G8 / Interviewer: So, would you prefer not to share this?
G8 / F: From me?
G8 / M: Yeah.
G8 / F: Oh my god (laughs).
G8 / M: I think I am allowed to watch what I want to
watch. I think everyone’s allowed to have a letch. Yeah.
Participants sought to avoid enabling others to have a moan
(i.e. to complain) at them in general (C2) but were particularly
concerned at the prospect of being held to account by partic-
ular individuals, often their partners, with respect to specific
activities including what they watch on TV (C7), their fi-
nances (C8), gaming (C11), exercise (C15), unguarded speech
captured by voice logging (C17), use of the central heating
(C19), domestic cleaning (C23) and bathroom and product
usage (C24). Privacy decisions were driven by consideration
of the granularity of data, e.g. seeing that £100 had been spent
was not the same as seeing that £100 had been spent on
sweeties, which was seen to undermine strategic ambiguity
or more prosaically the option of telling white lies (C20).
While accountability has its virtues (see Section 4.2.4), it is
not always welcome for social as well as personal reasons.
Privacy decisions were thus made to avoid disrupting the in-
timate interpersonal arrangements participants have already
put in place to manage their accountabilities, saying rather
than showing data (which is not so friendly) for example
(C8), and to otherwise avoid spoiling social events (birthdays,
Christmas, surprise parties, etc.) where secrecy is a necessary
ingredient of their success (C1).
4.1.3 Identity/impression management and autonomy
The potential for data to be used by others to hold participants
to account drove a particular concern with accountability that
centred on identity/impression management and the impor-
tance of data privacy to personal autonomy. Participants did
not want others to get a clear picture about them, and they
especially did not want them to be able to apprehend sensitive
issues (C1), including personal interests, bodily functions,
sexual fetishes, political views, personality traits and future
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plans. It is notable that privacy decisions were not accounted
for here tautologically either, but in terms of the need to man-
age what others might make of their data. Participants
recognised the potential for their data to be misconstrued by
others whether by accident or design and that it enabled others
to make assumptions about them (C17). They wished to avoid
giving others the wrong impression about themselves (C1)
and damaging their relationships to boot (C17). Participants
therefore sought to manage their identity and other people’s
impression of them, even those they lived with, in the face of
the constant creeping intrusion of data into every nook and
cranny of their lives (C23). As one participant put it with
respect to the smart bathroom (C24):
G6 / M: It is like smart watches and Fitbits and all the
rest of it. There is going to be metrics for every part of
your daily life, like how many times you have chewed
your sandwich, because obviously there is a healthy
number of chews, there has got to be; seventy-two, I
think. But it is this thing that everything has got to be
measured. For what reason I do not know. Dickens
wrote to this up in the 19th century with Thomas
Gradgrind who wanted to measure everything. Yeah, it
was a problem then. It was this kind of hard empiricism
that everything should be measured and quantified.
Whether you know the value of these things is another
matter.
Participants thus decided to keep data private to protect their
identity and manage other people’s impression of them in a
bid to preserve their autonomy, which was seen to be increas-
ingly threatened if not eroded by this hard empiricism. This
again applied to others as much as the individual, with partic-
ipants treating children as sacred(C22) and eschewing unfet-
tered data access on the basis that it compromises the founda-
tions of liberty(C8) and undermines personal choice.
4.1.4 Choice and control
It is becoming visible that privacy decisions were accounted
for in terms of interconnected orders of mundane reason that
put human security at the centre of participant’s decision-
making and sought to avoid potential harms through the man-
agement of interpersonal accountabilities, including identity
and impression management, in order to preserve personal
autonomy in the face of an unprecedented and apparently
relentless degree of data harvesting that is seen to be
destabilising the very foundations of liberty and thus
undermining personal choice. That data might be personal
and even sensitive means that participants expected to be able
to exercise choice over access and to control who their data
could or would be disclosed to (C3). As one participant put it
with respect to family monitoring (C12):
G22 / M: I cannot think of a situation in which I ever
would share that data and it would have to be through
me. It is not like they could just – I would not give
people access to a repository of that if that’s how you
are looking at it?
G22 / Interviewer: Yeah?
G22 / M: Because – if it is other people’s data then it is
their data not my data, so I do not get to choose.
Participants did not want to expose a repository of their data to
others in general, but rather wanted to design the disclosure of
data for specific recipients(C3) or relevant people (C12).
‘Recipient design’ was seen as key to controlling data disclo-
sure, even with intimate partners (C3), and even then, partic-
ipants might want to keep parts of the data private (C15). The
desire is to control who gets to see what was accounted for in
terms of the need to manage the potential consequences of
disclosure, such as it being misconstrued (C3). Recipient de-
sign was also seen as key to respecting and protecting the
privacy of other parties implicated in the data (C3).
Participants saw themselves as having a duty of trust not to
share data that implicated others unless there was real need
(C3). Participants also felt obliged to protect data due to po-
tential legal liability (C3).
4.1.5 Rejecting the premise
It was a notable feature of participants’ responses that while
answering the questions we had asked them – i.e., in which
box would they place this or that card and why? – that their
answers were frequently qualified in ways that drew the un-
derlying assumption of data collection and sharing into ques-
tion. For example, with reference to accessing home security
data (C18), including data from video cameras, one participant
rejected the premise entirely:
G16 / F: God it is like bloody big brother! I would not
even video who is in my house in the first place.
She was not alone in throwing the fundamental presumption
underlying the Databox, and data harvesting and use more
generally, into question. Our participants offered a range of
reasons and reasoning as to why the presumption was inap-
propriate. Participants simply could not understand the point
and purpose (C14, C19, C22, C23) of allowing others to ac-
cess data or think of a reason for allowing others to access data
(C21, C22), and access most definitely requires specific rea-
sons (C4). Similarly, they did not see why anyone would need
to see the data (C13, C22) or see any benefit in letting others
see the data (C9). Participants not only saw no need to share
data (C23) but could not see why others would want to access
it either. Not only would the data be utterly uninteresting(C3)
and not something that others would want to know (C7),
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enabling access would be over the top, grim, creepy and
annoying (C12, C24). It was the case too that the underlying
proposition was simply seen as redundant, that others can
already access data, so the question is neither here nor there
(C20) or practically irrelevant, having nothing do with partic-
ipant’s everyday lives (C15). Participants also rejected the
underlying presumption as they could see no occasion to share
data (C4). This reflects a common feature of participants’
decision-making, which turned throughout the game on for-
mulating practical uses case making specific questions rele-
vant to their everyday lives (either retrospectively or prospec-
tively). Failure to do so saw the underlying presumption being
rejected, whether or not cards were placed in the red (keep
private) or blue (access) box (see Section 4.2.6).
4.2 Deciding that others can access data
Several discrete orders of mundane reasoning were also in-
voked by participants in accounting for their decisions to al-
low others to access their data. Participants reasoned about
and accounted for access decisions in terms of having nothing
to hide; that they already share data or would find it useful to
do so; and because of the virtues of accountability.
Nonetheless, access decisions were subject to choose and con-
trol, and, just as with privacy decisions, we found that partic-
ipants also had occasion to question the Databox proposition
and notion of data sharing in general.
4.2.1 Nothing to hide
Access decisions were accounted for in terms of participants
having nothing to hide (C9, C11) and variations on this theme:
that there was nothing untoward in the data (C1), nothing
personal or private about it (C2, C16), nothing dodgy that
warrants hiding (C1), no secret(C7) and just harmless
information(C13) that participants would not mind or would
not be bothered about sharing with others (C1, C11, C16,
C20). As one participant put it when asked about allowing
others to access her driving data (C20), for example:
G9 / Interviewer: You would be worried about him
judging your driving or your family judging your
driving?
G9 / F: I just do not think anyone would be bothered. So,
I would not really mind.
The data was often seen as trivial, just crap (C2)—sudoku
scores, music, lights on, lights off, etc.—and participants had
no issues with sharing (C2, C19) as the data was seen to be of
little consequence. Indeed, the data was seen as something that
others could not do anything with(C2) and posed no existen-
tial threat (C7, C21). Participants were also sensitive to the
social context in which they and the data reside, and that data
do not belong to a single person unless you live alone (C18).
There is then no reason not to share data (C19), and no
permission is required by participants to share it between us
(C22). Trust(C23) occasionally accounted for the potential
availability of data to friends, but access decisions stood more
firmly on the perceived harmlessness of the data and what is
effectively shared ownership or at least shared rights and priv-
ileges. It was also the case that participants found it too much
effort to keep data private (C24), that one would really have to
have something to hide(C21) and good reason to hide it (C8)
to want to go to the trouble of doing that.
4.2.2 We already share data
It soon became apparent that while focusing our questions on
ideation cards, we were not dealing with purely hypothetical
situations. Participants already share data with one another in
the course of their everyday lives, and the social context in
which they reside was often invoked to account for access
decisions. Indeed, it became apparent that domestic life con-
sists for many participants of a shared and mutually visible
ecology of activities, practices, devices and data. Thus, access
decisions were accounted for in terms of living together(C23)
and already sharing information(C24) that anyone can see
(C20, C21), where anyone means everybody here including
family and friends (C5, C6). Participants shared devices (C1),
used family share (C2), synced data across devices (C3), used
common devices (C6), joint accounts(C8) and shared data
sources (C9). For example (C1):
G21 / F: The iPad, its open to anyone isn’t it? Because
we both have the log in
G21 / M: Oh, and family
G21 / F: And the laptop
Interviewer: So, it is a shared device. What about your
personal machines?
G21 / F: We both have access to each other’s. It is not
intentionally shared; it just is shared.
Whether to share messages from others (C3), monitor one
another’s whereabouts, coordinate people and events, en-
hance personal safety (C4), track and find each other (C12),
calculate each other’s share of the energy bill (C19), etc.,
sharing data with others was for participants accountably
something you usually do, don`t you? (C4). It is also usual
for data to extend beyond the immediate confines of the home
to other social actors, the dog walker (C18), work colleagues
(C15), local community groups (C16), etc., reflecting partici-
pants’ broader interests, engagement and relationships with
others. Access decisions were thus predicated on the relevance
of data to oneself-and-others. While there is some element of
choice in this (C6), e.g. the particular messages or photos one
shares, participants nevertheless saw the sociality of domestic
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life as largely prohibiting data being treated as wholly private
(C1, C3, C4, C7, C8, C21). Rather data was seen as already
shared by default of living with others, something that sits
within a lively social context and is of intersubjective rele-
vance and utility.
4.2.3 It could be useful
Access decisions predicated on the intersubjective relevance
and utility of data extended beyond what participants already
do with data to considerations of what might usefully be done
with it. This is then a distinctive order of reasoning concerned
not with extant data sharing practices but potential data shar-
ing practices. Of particular note was the potential participants
saw in exploiting data tomonitor family members (C11, C12,
C13, C14, C19, C22) in the course of carrying out their pa-
rental responsibilities. Participants thus envisaged using the
data to log the games their children played (C11), to see where
their kids and the pets are (C12, C13), to prioritise children’s
health and well-being (C14), to see how their child is learning
and progressing and otherwise curtail non-beneficial play
(C22). As one couple put it in considering household appli-
ance data, for example (C19):
G15 / F: I do not mind share it within our family. I do not
know, probably the fridge would be aware [child’s
name] opens the fridge two times, three times, five times
or more per day, I do not know
G15 / M: You can make statistic of it. You can be aware
of what choices she picking up from the fridge. You can
understand and analyse as well. You can see which
brands she loves or not. You can do many things with
these. I think again this is also very useful thing to share.
Access decisions were shot through with prospective as well
as retrospective accounts of data sharing in everyday life.
Accompanying the shared by default, inherently social, inter-
subjectively relevant and useful grounds upon which data is
already shared, prospective accountability surfaces the fore-
seeable potential of data to help not hinder(C14) participants
in exercising the responsibilities they have for those they live
with as complementary grounds for arriving at access
decisions.
4.2.4 The virtues of accountability
Access decisions were also taken on the basis that definite
virtues were seen to accompany the accountability created in
sharing data with others. While data could be used to hold
people to account for the things they have (or have not) done,
this was not always a bad thing, nor is it limited to people but
includes devices, products and appliances (C21, C23, C24).
Participants thus found that data is like having a witness(C17)
and that access would enable household members to check up
on and seewhat is going on in the home (C21, C23, C24). The
ability to check and see was in turn seen to enhance safety
(C4, C19, C21) and to empower household members as the
following consideration of household monitoring (C16)
illustrates:
G14 / F1: It is like I have this app, yeah, but they do not
have and I cannot
Interviewer: This is no just kind of app. You can think
smart devices in your home, for example, for lights
G14 / F2: We can share because do you remember? One
day I forgot to close gas. We should share and they
should know.
G14 / M:What she says if we could track it in the device
that she forgot to switch the gas off. I think it is good to
share because we are living in a house that and we all
care about this house. Yeah, and we all need to know
what conditions are in the house.
Accountability allows others to look at issues (C19), including
external parties where data was seen a key to rendering land-
lords accountable for dangerous appliances and providing
evidence and proof of their failings (C16). Access decisions
thus turned upon the perceived virtues of accountability and
empowering others to inspect what is going on in the home as
a necessary precursor to intervention.
4.2.5 Choice and control
Those participants’ attributed virtues to accountability do not
mean that they were happy to allow unfettered access to their
data. Participants recognised the occasional need for privacy,
whether to avoid rendering oneself accountable for things they
do not want to be accountable for (C4) and feeling concomi-
tantly uncomfortable or embarrassed (C10), breaching
secrecy (C17), spoiling surprises (C9, C12, C19) or simply
to avoid others taking data out of context (C1, C15). Access is
thus dependent on who is looking at the data (C2) and is
accompanied by the practical need to constrain access based
on the type of data in question and the potential recipients
(C3), as one participant highlights in considering smart toys
(C22), for example:
G16 /F: In principle [yes], but there is a big difference
between sharing with your partner or the father of your
children and sharing with even the next step out of fam-
ily or close friends. There is a massive difference be-
tween that.
Access is also dependent on context (C6, C18), on not only
who is accessing what but why and to what end. While being
prepared to allow different people to access different data(C7)
Pers Ubiquit Comput
in principle, doing so has to be appropriate to both recipient
and sharer (C6). It also has to be done in a controlled way (C6,
C12, C15) for selective people (C4, C6, C11, C12, C13, C14,
C15, C16, C18, C19, C22) at selective times (C4, C12) on a
limited basis(C5) for a specific purpose (C5, C14) and in-
volves only so much data as is necessary (C19). Just as par-
ticipants decided to keep data private because they wished to
exercise control over its disclosure through ‘recipient design’,
then so too access decisions turn on the same proviso.
4.2.6 Rejecting the premise
Access decisions were clearly rooted in the social fabric of
participants’ everyday lives, and while they were evidently
willing to share data with other people they knew, this did
not mean they accepted the Databox proposition without ques-
tion. Participants placed value on speaking to people(C3) and
so were unconvinced by the practical day-to-day relevance of
the Databox proposition. Others did not think the people they
knew would be impressed by their data (C7) or really care
about it (C23), that it was essentially uninteresting, though
some worried that it might make others feel bad(C9) and
breed hypochondriacs (C14). Some participants felt that in
the absence of actually being asked to share data with others,
they could not really make an informed decision (C21), but by
far and away the most common reason for doubting the prop-
osition lay in the question, why? Why would they want to
know (C23)? Why, for what purpose (C1)? It is not simply
that participants need a reason(C2) to share data that is under
their personal control but that whatever the reason it would be
weird (C3, C16), they would be weird(C24) and they might
think you are a bit weird too (C1):
G9 / M: I would share it with you.
G9 / F: Yeah. But why though? Like, it is not a resound-
ing “No, I wouldn’t let you look through my search
history.” I would not mind it. It is not like anything there
is a cause for concern. But it is just kind of like, a bit
awkward. You might feel like you have to justify stuff
you are looking at or they might just think you are a bit
weird.
The evident willingness of participants to allow other people
they know to access their data, indeed the default inevitability
of access in many cases along with the retrospective and pro-
spective intersubjective utilities and virtues that accountably
attach to it, should be tempered then by the weirdness of
technical mechanisms that seek to support interpersonal data
sharing. This is not to dismiss technological efforts—75% of
participants could see a place for the Databox in their every-
day lives—but it is to highlight their anthropological
strangeness at this point in time.
4.3 Contesting access
Before moving on to consider what our findings might mean
for the design of technological mechanisms supporting inter-
personal data sharing and collaborative data management in
the home, it also important to recognise the contested charac-
ter of our findings. There is a sense in which every ideation
card presented was contested, insofar as no type of data was
wholly agreed upon as private or accessible by our partici-
pants. Furthermore, some cards were not boxed at all. We
focus here briefly on the reasoned grounds upon which this
outcome stood (we say briefly as not many cards were treated
this way). Card 11 (gaming data) was the most contested
card—9 participants did not box it—but this was on the mun-
dane grounds that it was simply irrelevant, they did not play
digital games and so this data was not a feature of their every-
day lives. Two participants simply could not decide how to
respond to a couple of cards (C2, C18), being 50-50 as to
whether or not it would be a good idea to share data or not.
A couple of participants agreed to disagree, seeing the others’
logic but not concurring with it (C4, C7). And one participant
begged the question as to why you would store the data in the
first place (C5)? Lack of relevance notwithstanding, then lack
of agreement was the most common grounds upon which
access decisions were challenged and contested, though the
reasons offered were not all of apiece. One participant sought
to avoid being accountable for their behaviour and so not
would agree to let their partner access the data (C20).
Another had nothing to hide, but their partner did not want
the data anyway (C24). However, access was a more conten-
tious topic outside of immediate partner or spouse relation-
ships. Thus, housemates contested access on the basis of the
data being personal and lacking trust in recipients (C1, C10),
and children and teenagers, while happy to access their par-
ents’ data, did not wish to reciprocate (C12, C17).
G15 / C: Alexa and Siri? I like using Siri.
G15 / F: But if I am hearing what you are telling to them,
do you mind if I hear those conversations between you
and Siri?
G15 / C: No!
G15 / M Why not?
G15 / C: This is my data.
G15 / F: This is too much personal?
G15 / M: You have to explain us why? We want to
know it.
G15 / C: No. No. No.
Interviewer: I guess you are using them for personal
purposes?
G15 / C: Yes. This is private.
The contested character of our findings reveals an underlying
dynamic to domestic life that is also consequential to
Pers Ubiquit Comput
collaborative data management and its support. Simply put,
people will disagree, they will not always want to be account-
able to one another, they will have occasion to lack trust, and
they will not necessarily want to reciprocate. The nature of our
relationships, the kinds of people we live with, their ages and
stages of life, all shape and drive this dynamic and it is towards
understandings the implications it holds for design that we
now turn.
5 Discussion
It could be argued that the cardboard box study speaks to the
data privacy literature by asking people to decide whether or
not to keep data private.For the vast bulk of the time, data
privacy is simply not an issue in domestic life. As the partic-
ipants in our study make perspicuous, people already share
data with one another as a matter of course by virtue of their
living in a shared ecology of activities, practices and devices.
Amongst themselves there is little that warrants hiding; indeed
hiding data from other co-inhabitants is often seen to involve
too much effort given that much of it is ‘crap’ that poses ‘no
existential threat’, though we note members of shared house-
holds are sometimes more circumspect. Furthermore, mem-
bers find that a great deal of data shared by default of living
together is socially useful, enabling them to know what others
are doing and to respond appropriately. The brute fact is that
the sociality of domestic life often prohibits data being treated
as wholly private. Rather data is seen and treated as something
that is already shared by default of living with others and is of
intersubjective relevance and utility.
This is not to say there is no need for privacy in the con-
nected home. Our study makes it perspicuous that privacy is
occasionally invoked to negate the potential for data to render
members accountable to the cohort for everything they do
(what they eat, watch on TV, how much energy they use,
the cleaning they do, or time they spend playing games,
etc.). The what of the matter is neither here nor there, as what
people might be held accountable for changes from home to
home, cohort to cohort, but there is clearly strong need to be
able to control one’s accountability in the connected home of
the present and the future. As our study makes visible, con-
trolling accountability is key to a person’s identity and impres-
sion management [29], particularly where sensitive issues
(such as personality traits, bodily functions, sexual fetishes
and political views) are concerned. In short, our participants
sought to control the accountabilities created by data to avoid
giving others the ‘wrong impression’ about themselves, which
might in turn ‘be damaging’ to their relationships.
The potential for data to damage people and their relation-
ships lies at the heart of our participants’ concern with data
privacy. Privacy then plays a social function. It is not an end in
itself, not merely a matter of being able to withhold
information, but a means to an end: relationship maintenance.
The social function of privacy is to avert perceptible risks to
human security and thus avoid harms to members of the social
unit created, in this case, by the increased potential for ac-
countability that accompanies the increased amounts of data
in the connected home. While the ability to hold people (and
devices) to account clearly has its virtues, unchecked it creates
real and tangible threats to members’ interpersonal relation-
ships. The home is a key site for ‘intimate personal violence’
[e.g. 49], and the digital already is implicated in domestic
harms, enabling gas lighting and domestic abuse [e.g. 3, 18].
Our participants saw occasional need then to control access to
data in order to avoid rendering themselves uncomfortable,
subject to embarrassment or other serious consequence in-
cluding effects that might impact their liberty and autonomy.
At the same time, however, participants recognised the inter-
subjective nature of data: that it like them resides in a social
context inhabited by other people and is located in a mutually
visible ecology of activities, practices and devices that accords
by default of living together shared rights and privileges over
data access and disclosure. Data is thus a ‘relational object’
[10], i.e. an object that is inextricably embedded in a nexus of
social relationships and relational concerns that organise ac-
cess, and the shared rights and privileges that control it include
the right to contest privacy decisions and disagree with them.
There is a strong sense then in which privacy decisions are
negotiated, not in the sense understood by the interdependent
privacy literature as to do with conflict resolution, but with the
disclosure (or not) of data. As Tolmie and Crabtree [67] elab-
orate, the negotiation is done through ‘the ‘calculus of ac-
countability’, which governs the practical politics of sharing
in everyday life. The calculus seeks to balance the manage-
ment of cohorts, identities, and the visibility of the digital self
in the networked world with considerations of just who it is
persons might be accountable to and in what ways. Our study
like theirs finds that data is disclosed on the basis of ‘recipient
design’, i.e. through the interactional crafting of data access
and disclosure in specific places, at specific times, in specific
ways, for specific people to mitigate perceived risks or threats.
Recipient design is a pronounced feature of the cardboard box
study, driving both privacy and access decisions. Our study
extends our understanding of the recipient design of data dis-
closure, not only highlighting the moral duty of trust that
informs the calculus with respect to mixed data, and the need
to enable persons to allow different people to access different
data, at selective times, on a limited basis, for a specific pur-
pose, and only with so much data as is necessary, but also
raising the critical question of who gets to decide these matters
and how?
Recipient design is not only concerned with the interaction-
al tailoring of information, including its non-disclosure. As
our study makes perspicuous, it also trades on and presup-
poses that the parties to interaction have the rights and
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privileges to do so. In environments where data is shared by
default of living together, collaborative data management
mechanisms are needed that allow household members to
make that determination and specify who amongst them can
take decisions to disclose data or withhold access. This is a
non-trivial requirement, for as insofar as data is distributed
across members, then rights and privileges are also be distrib-
uted and tied to the different types and subsets of data. Add to
this the dynamics of family life -of parenting and being
parented, of growing up, and growing old, etc.-, it becomes
clear that mechanisms not only need to be capable of handling
the specifics of data sharing on any occasion (the just who,
just what, just when, for just how long, etc.) but also the fluid
set of relationships that are implicated in its use. What on one
day in one situation only requires one parents to say so, for
example, may on and in another require both, and in the future
their children’s as well, or instead.
5.1 Moving beyond interdependent privacy
Any suggestion, then, that interdependent privacy might hold
the keys to collaborative datamanagement in the homewould,
at this point in time, be rather tenuous for we are not dealing
here with individuals-in-a-group but persons meshed together
in a social unit, who share data by default of living together
and who have shared but differentially distributed rights and
privileges over data access and disclosure. Furthermore, those
rights and privileges are shaped by the fluid dynamics of ev-
eryday life in an environment where privacy decisions are
always occasioned and subject to the calculus of accountabil-
ity and negotiation through recipient design on a case-by-case
basis. The mechanisms proposed by interdependent privacy
assume that privacy decisions allowing persons to avoid harm
can be prefigured, a matter of collaboratively specifying pref-
erences and policies beforehand or engaging in conflict reso-
lution after the fact. However, the priorities of everyday life
(getting the kids up, dressed, fed, to school on time and all that
other stuff we have to do) seem to us to mitigate against
families expending effort on encoding data and attaching pol-
icies to its use. Furthermore, there is no possibility of members
specifying privacy policies in advance other than in the most
gross or general of terms, for not only do all rules imply
infinite regress and beg the question of when and how they
should be applied, they are also ‘merely advisory to action’
[77] and so their practical relevance to actual concrete situa-
tions has to be determined within the unfolding flow of every-
day life. Manually voting or delegating conflict resolution to
automated strategies based on measures or indeed the
metrication of intimacy or reciprocity is unlikely to set-
tle disagreements either; on the contrary, they may well
exacerbate them.
It might be argued that we are a little harsh in our treatment
of interdependent privacy. However, our study, amongst
many others, underscores the fact that people have preferences
for data sharing, that these implicate others, that negotiations
take place between them, that conflicts arise and are resolved.
Nonetheless, efforts to support collaborative data manage-
ment in the home have a very long way to go. As Tolmie
and Crabtree [67] put it:
Digital systems derail the case-by-case interactional
crafting and shaping which is at the core of the practical
politics of sharing, and instead oblige people to engage
in generic rather than situated practices of action and
reasoning to manage the sharing of personal data in
the digital world.
If interdependent privacy is to enable collaborative data man-
agement in the home, it will need to change its analytic focus
and move beyond an individual-in-the-group conception of
privacy to see privacy as a function within a social unit that
enables its members to avoid the potential harms created by
accountability in an increasingly connected world [28]. It will
need to move beyond photos as test cases for its approaches. It
will need to develop support mechanisms to enable the differ-
ential distribution of rights and privileges within the dynamic
and fluid context of everyday life in the home. And it will need
to support the calculus of accountability and enable recipient
design not as a precursor to data access and disclosure but as
something that can be crafted on a case-by-case as members
deem circumstance and occasion dictate. Current access con-
trol and negotiation mechanisms do not offer this level of
collaborative support.
5.2 Limitations
The results reported herein should be considered in light of
some limitations. Of the 22 households in our study, it was not
possible to always include all members, for various practical
reasons—disinterest in taking part, unavailability and addi-
tionally in the case of children it might simply be that their
age rendered it impossible. This did mean though that we
inevitably missed some in-groupdynamics—for example,
while a 7-years-old might be too young to meaningfully par-
ticipate in a 90-min group interview, they would nevertheless
have some role to play in regard to data generated by them in
the home. While our cohort did cut across age, family role,
occupation, class and ethnicity, it could certainly be argued
that additional diversity amongst our participants would have
expanded the study’s claims of generalisability. We recognise
that even at the level of mundane reasoning considered here,
profoundly different cultures and living arrangements might
produce different findings. Similarly, a greater involvement of
children might have surfaced different interactions—though
the practical challenges of further involving children would
likely require a study specifically formulated for this purpose.
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Conducting the game as a shared enactment amongst mem-
bers was a deliberate choice to surface typical everyday house-
hold engagements. Inevitably, this also means that disparities
between members—whether in terms of authority, agency,
expertise or other—might impact on their engagement with
the game. From the standpoint of individualistic theorisations
of privacy, this could be considered a weakness, though from
the authors’ perspective it is simply a reflection of the
asymmetries which are, rightly or wrongly, to be found in
any group. In regard to participants’ capacity to be honest in
front of one another—one could easily imagine for example a
teen being unwilling to share particularly contentious infor-
mation in front of their parents that theymight otherwise share
under the guise of anonymity with an interviewer—this is
certainly a possibility, though we did encourage all partici-
pants at the start of the game to focus on general principles
rather than specific examples should they have any concerns.
Again, this is a case where a specifically tailored research
design would be productive.
Finally, as noted in Section 4, many cards were misinterpreted
by aminority of participants. In part we believe this reflects the fact
that questions of privacy are commonly framed as being a matter
of threats fromunknown third parties, to the detriment of questions
of interpersonal privacy. The presence of deck two, which did
probe such questions, may have contributed to the confusion.
Regardless, the instructions given to participants should have been
clearer so that some responses did not have to be disregarded from
the analysis.
6 Conclusion
The home is a site marked by the increasing collection and use of
personal data, whether online or from connected devices. This
trend is accompanied by new data protection regulation and tech-
nological efforts to develop privacy enhancing technologies
(PETs). However, both focus on the individual despite the fact that
a great deal of the data generated within the connected home is
interpersonal in nature [28] and cannot therefore be attributed to an
individual. There is a significant gap in our understanding of the
increasing collection and use of personal data in social contexts
generally and the home in particular and the concomitant challenge
of enabling collaborative datamanagement in the connected home.
In a bid to address the challenge, we designed and deployed the
‘cardboard box’, a proxy for a PET called the Databox that adapts
the technology probe approach to provoke mundane reason about
the interpersonal nature of data in the home. The study reveals that:
& A great deal of data in the current and prospective con-
nected home is shared by default of persons living
together in a mutually visible ecology of activities, prac-
tices and devices.
& Privacy is an occasioned (not ubiquitous) feature of every-
day life in the home that plays a social function concerned
to ensure human security and protect people from the
harms created by increased accountability created by data.
& Collaborative mechanisms are required to enable the case-
by-case negotiation of privacy decisions, including the
differential distribution of rights and privileges in a dy-
namic and fluid context.
These original findings build on and extend previous work
[13, 28, 67] and are of relevance to technological efforts to
support the collaborative management of data. However, as
we show in this paper, current technological solutions de-
signed under the auspices of ‘interdependent privacy’ [34]
are predicated on inadequate conceptualisations of users as
individuals-in-a-group rather than members of a social unit
whose data is necessarily meshed together with others. This
leads to collaborative access control and conflict resolution
(negotiation) mechanisms that are ill-suited to deployment in
the home. Not only are household members unlikely to invest
time and effort in pre-specifying privacy policies to regulate
the use of shared data by others in the home, the practical
relevance of such rule-based solutions will always be subject
to evaluation on actual occasions of data access and disclo-
sure. Furthermore, both manual and automated negotiation
mechanisms fail to support the negotiated character of data
sharing as understood by household members, which is con-
cerned with the recipient design of data access and disclosure
rather than conflict resolution, and medicated solutions to con-
flict are only likely to pour oil on troubled waters.
Current technical mechanisms offered by interdependent
privacy do not provide adequate support for collaborative data
management in the connected home, and while participants in
our study saw some promise in the Databox, we would sound
a note of caution. Technological solutions are unlikely to sit
comfortably in an environment where its inhabitants increas-
ingly perceive themselves to be threatened by increasing vol-
umes of data. While household members are clearly cognisant
of the potential for harm, solutions that help them manage
human security by enabling or curtailing access to data are
currently seen as ‘a bit awkward’. It is not that people do not
get the point of technological solutions but rather that they are
seen to be part of an ‘annoying’ problem, a ‘hard empiricism
creeping into every nook and cranny’ of domestic life, where
‘everything is measured and quantified’. Access control solu-
tions thus seem ‘over the top’ and ‘unfriendly’ in an environ-
ment where a great deal of data is born social and otherwise
shared by default of living together and stand in sharp contrast
to ‘speaking to people’. There is promise then, but it is tem-
pered by human frustration at the predicament that makes
technological solutions necessary, and this may well generate
some resistance to adoption in the short term. Nonetheless,
there is clear and evident need to support collaborative data
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management and enable people to negotiate interperson-
al data access in the home. The potential for harm is
otherwise too great.
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